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Issues of environmental injustice in siting of environmental hazards are well known. Based on 
past research, the expectation is that lower socioeconomic status populations are systematically 
subject to higher levels of environmental risk in their communities. In this paper, I investigate 
whether similar patterns appear prevalent in environmental improvement as well. First, I assess 
the characteristics of the communities in which brownfield sites are currently located. Then, I 
compare the likelihood and prioritization of cleaning up brownfield sites based on the 
composition of their neighborhoods. I find that while sites in communities with larger minority 
populations are likely to move at a slower pace through the initial assessment phases of the 
cleanup process, they are no less likely to ultimately be cleaned up. I suggest that economic and 
political considerations are better explanations of this result than overt discrimination. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A substantial base of literature tends to confirm the notion that lower socioeconomic 
status populations (however defined) tend to live in proximity to lower environmental quality 
(Hamilton, 1995; Arora and Cason, 1999; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001; Ringquist, 2005; Mohai 
and Saha, 2006; Campbell, Peck and Tschudi, 2009). There is considerably less clarity with 
regard to the causes of this empirical result. Environmental justice studies are usually cross 
sectional investigations of the consequences of environmentally hazardous land uses at a 
particular point in time (Noonan, 2008). It is thus not surprising that several causal explanations 
have been given empirical support, nor is it surprising that there is considerable variation in the 
effects for different types of lower status populations. Nevertheless, a consensus is emerging that 
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the relationship between minority status and living in proximity to lower environmental quality 
is robust (Campbell, Peck, and Tschudi, 2009), and that the three most common causal 
explanations are insufficient to explain this result independently (Hamilton, 1995).  
 While much attention has been given to siting hazardous facilities (Been and Gupta, 
1997; Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008) – that is, the justice implications of environmental degradation 
– considerably less has been given to the decontamination and redevelopment, or generally, 
environmental improvement. Is there a second side to environmental justice concerns? Do lower 
socioeconomic status areas also tend to see less environmental improvement than their higher 
status counterparts?  
 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines a brownfield as “a property, 
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or 
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant”. In this paper, I 
investigate the cleanup prioritization of brownfields in a framework that incorporates each of the 
three major causal arguments found in the environmental justice literature: the discrimination 
argument, the collective action argument and the residential sorting argument. Findings are 
mixed: brownfield sites located in lower socioeconomic status areas are no more or less likely to 
ultimately be cleaned, but they tend to move more slowly through the early assessment stages of 
the cleanup process. I suggest that this result is indicative of politics and economic pressures 
rather than overt discrimination by policymakers. In the sections that follow, I first provide a 
background review of environmental justice and describe why there may be an additional area of 
concern with regard to environmental improvement. Then I describe the empirical model, 
hypotheses and data I use to test the general hypothesis that there is discrimination in 
environmental improvement. Finally, I discuss the results and offer some suggestions for policy. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 The environmental injustice effect has been noted in several social science fields, leading 
to several different explanations for the observed phenomenon (Hamilton, 1995; Campbell, Peck, 
and Tschudi, 2009). Commonly, these explanations, discrimination, collective action, and 
residential sorting, are treated as mutually exclusive, with much of the literature consisting of 
refutation of one causal explanation in the context of validation of another (Anderton, et al, 
2004; Bowen, 2000). For example, Been and Gupta (1997) posit a residential sorting explanation 
in the context of a critique of discrimination literature which failed to account for the effect of 
time. Noonan (2008) notes that methodological assumptions and predilections tend to color the 
results of much of the environmental justice research. 
 Nevertheless, with evidence supporting each of the three causal explanations, it is most 
likely the case that some combination of each is important to understand the environmental 
injustice outcome. It may be the case that methodological approaches or contextual factors 
determine the relative importance of each factor vis a vis the others, but it seems more likely that 
that different factors affect the overall system at different points in the process. After describing 
the three major causal arguments in turn, I will propose a conceptual framework in which 
different effects are conceived as being relatively more important depending upon the stage of 
the process that is being analyzed. 
Discrimination 
 The fact that this general area of research is generally referred to as environmental justice 
is indicative of the strength of the discrimination explanation. When issues of environmental 
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justice began to attract the attention of researchers and policymakers, the assumed cause was 
discrimination. The initial description of the phenomenon began in the late 1980s with several 
studies, the Commission for Racial Justice Study for the United Church of Christ in 1987 being 
the most visible. This study, and others, first noted the trend by assessing the placement of 
hazardous facilities, such as hazardous waste processing plants and dumps. Such sites were much 
more likely to be situated in poor and/or minority neighborhoods, and were extremely unlikely to 
be found in middle or upper class areas.  
 These findings led to a subsequent stream of academic research positing that the 
explanation was, at least by implication, discrimination (Bullard, 1990; Goldman and Fitton, 
1994; Wolverton, 2002). Whether acting in the capacity of policymakers or of firm owners, elite 
made decisions to place facilities in predominantly minority areas in order to, at best, shelter 
themselves and other elites from environmental risk, or, at worst, to specifically site risk with 
non-elite populations (Mohai and Bryant, 1992). Findings, framed in this conceptual context, 
tended to reinforce the idea over time, even when varying the geographical units of analysis 
(Mohai and Saha, 2006). Poor populations, especially poor minority populations had a tendency 
to live in closer proximity to environmentally risky facilities than whites (Ringquist, 2005). 
Although the effect may be stronger in the southern states than in other regions (Kriesel, Centner 
and Keeler, 1996), the correlation between an area being the site of a locally undesirable land use 
(LULU) and also having a larger concentration of minority residents seems to remain robust 
(Rinquist, 2005). 
 Making the leap between correlation and causation based on discrimination has proved 
far more tenuous. The primary problem with the causal argument is based on the methodological 
approach employed in environmental justice studies (Mohai and Saha, 2006; Noonan, 2008). For 
	   5	  
the most part, studies are cross sectional in nature, focusing on the current composition of a 
community in which a LULU was located. In the mid 1990s, some investigators (Kriesel, 
Centner, and Keeler, 1996; Been and Gupta, 1997) began to note the limitations in making a 
causal assertion based on the current composition of the neighborhood. If indeed the cause of the 
phenomenon was discrimination by elites, then the current composition of a neighborhood with a 
site is not necessarily relevant; the more relevant consideration was the composition of the 
community at the time the siting decision was made. This differentiation and also called into 
question the validity of the discrimination explanation (Hamilton, 1995). When considering 
composition at the time that a facility was sited, it was found that areas did not always tend to be 
any poorer or have larger minority populations (Been and Gupta, 1997). In fact, as the 1990s 
wore on, and policy makers became aware of environmental justice, sites were a bit less likely to 
be placed in certain minority areas (Been and Gupta, 1997). Nevertheless, minorities and the 
poor still tended to be clustered in the vicinity of LULUs (Hird, 1993). If not discrimination, at 
least not exclusively, then other causal mechanisms must be at work. 
Residential Sorting 
 One of the competing explanations is based on the Tiebout (1956) residential sorting 
hypothesis. Not surprisingly, it has been noted that real estate values and neighborhood quality 
reputations are negatively affected by the siting of a hazardous facility (Hird, 1993). After a 
hazardous facility begins operations, real estate prices in its proximity can be expected to fall 
(Kohlhase, 1991), and with them, the reputation of the community is also likely to suffer 
(Messer, et al, 2006). That is, even if a facility was built in a middle class, primarily white 
neighborhood, it is likely that those who can afford to move away will, demand for homes near 
the site will drop, causing values (and prices) to drop as well (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). These 
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price decreases can make the area affordable for poorer regional residents; wealthier residents 
filter out, poorer, often minority, residents filter in, and the net result is a cluster of poor, often 
minority residents near a hazardous facility. What may have appeared overtly discriminatory is 
in fact a natural mechanism of the housing market.  
 The problem with this causal explanation, however, is evident in many empirical works. 
Been and Gupta (1997) investigate the composition of neighborhoods at the time the siting 
decision was made. Their results suggest that the sorting hypothesis is a plausibly valid causal 
explanation, but it is incomplete. While they note that hazardous facilities were actually a bit less 
likely to be sited in predominantly African-American neighborhoods, sites were a bit more likely 
to be placed in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. Subsequent studies, as noted by 
Ringquist (2005), Campbell, Peck and Tschudi (2009), and others find cause to suspect that the 
residential sorting hypothesis is a limited, although certainly important aspect of environmental 
justice. 
Collective Action 
 Largely missing from the discrimination and residential sorting explanations is an 
acknowledgement of the central importance that political activities can have on decisions that 
affect communities (Hamilton, 1995). A third causal view is based on collective action and 
political power, and posits that when considering where to site hazardous facilities, owners or 
policy makers will opt for locations where they expect relatively little political conflict, that is, 
areas where the political opposition will tend to be disjointed and ineffective. Not coincidentally, 
areas where political action tends to be either weak or disorganized also tend to be poorer 
(Hamilton, 1995). The extensive research in this area relates to the so-called NIMBY (not in my 
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backyard) phenomenon (Arora and Cason, 1999). When residents of a community are 
sufficiently organized and politically active, the expectation is that they can thwart a potential 
decision to place a hazardous facility in their vicinity. In addition to active lobbying and 
collective action, NIMBY effects can also be implied and assumed by policymakers. It may be 
assumed that some residents in certain areas will be more likely to act collectively, so, in an 
effort to avoid any political conflict, some areas may not even be considered as potential sites for 
hazardous facilities (Helland and Whitford, 2003). If political opposition is expected to be 
disjointed or negligible, the community will be an attractive site. Thus, rather than firm owners 
or policy makers acting in a discriminatory manner, they act in a self interested manner, limiting 
negative publicity and enhancing their individual electoral prospects; economic factors matter 
mostly in terms of political power. Wealthier communities are expected to have more political 
power, expressed via a greater propensity to engage in political activity. 
 However, it is difficult to extrapolate these political causes from either discrimination or 
residential sorting, since collective NIMBY actions may work in two separate ways, both of 
which reinforce existing siting trends and residential sorting. In the first case, an area may not 
even be considered for a siting if opposition is expected to be organized and active; but is this 
lack of consideration a function of expected political activity, a function avoidance of devaluing 
high value land (based on the Coase Theorem, see Hamilton, 1995), or a function of a desire to 
avoid exposing elites to environmental hazards? In a second case where a site decision has been 
proposed, if residents are spurred to collective opposition, the desire on the part of policymakers 
or firm owners to mitigate or avoid political confrontation and negative publicity may convince 
them to scrap a proposed or even planned site and move to another community where opposition 
will be less intense. The difficulty is determining which factors lead to an end result. The 
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expectation is that political opposition will tend to be disjointed in minority neighborhoods, 
especially poor minority neighborhoods, so firms and policymakers will have a tendency to place 
hazardous facilities in these locations. However, even when firms and policymakers consider 
environmental justice and seek to site facilities in other locations, after construction, those who 
can move will, and through residential filtering (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008), will be replaced by 
lower socioeconomic status residents. Thus, although firms and policymakers were not acting in 
a discriminatory manner, the end result is the same – clusters of poor minority residents near 
hazardous sites. 
These complications illustrate the likelihood that political activity, elite decision-making, 
and market activities occur over time, with each in turn affecting subsequent decisions, political 
actions and market activities. For example, collective action can affect policy decisions, but this 
political activity is also a reaction to a policy’s market outcomes and previous decisions that 
were made. Policymakers react to political activity but also to market outcomes, and are 
constrained by decisions that were made in the past. The market is constantly reacting to and 
interacting with the rules and institutions that policy decisions establish, and the result of these 
interactions in turn affect the propensities of individuals to engage in political or collective 
action. 
 Given this complexity, it is not surprising that it has been difficult to differentiate the 
effects of any particular activity on environmental justice outcomes. The relative importance of 
one effect versus another may be heavily dependent upon the timing of the study, or nature of the 
data used in an analysis (Noonan, 2008). This may be further complicated by consideration of 
the path dependence and feedback loops of policy decisions and market interactions within a 
policy system, as illustrated in Figure 1. I attempt to address these complications by focusing on 
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a study of environmental improvement rather than cases of environmental degradation. In this 
manner, I may be able to better control for the effect of market pressures on environmental 
policy decisions and instead focus on the potential for discriminatory decisions. 
****Figure 1 about here**** 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 
A Second Side 
Virtually all existing environmental justice research relates to increased environmental 
risk or degradation (Ringquist, 2005). However, as the American economy transitions to post-
industrial realities, decisions are increasingly likely to focus on environmental improvement and 
abatement of environmental risk (De Sousa, 2004). Thus, there may be a second side of 
environmental injustice to consider; in addition to living with higher levels of environmental 
risk, the poor and/or minorities may also face less, or a slower pace of, abatement of that risk. A 
consideration of the equity implications of environmental cleanup will provide a useful bookend 
for the existing understanding of environmental justice, and may also offer advantages in 
understanding the relative importance of the discrimination and collective action explanations 
versus residential sorting. 
In the residential sorting framework, the expectation is that changes in environmental 
quality will appeal to certain types of residents (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). If environmental 
quality in a community decreases, then comparatively wealthier residents will leave, and the 
demand for homes in the community will fall amongst other wealthier potential residents. This 
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will depress property values, making the homes affordable to those for whom environmental 
quality is a secondary consideration to price, if it is a consideration at all (Kohlhase, 1991). Thus, 
the community in which a hazardous facility has been sited will come to be made up of poorer 
residents than those who were there prior to the siting. Conversely, when the environment 
improves, wealthier residents and investors may see properties that are undervalued in a 
neighborhood that had, but no longer has, low environmental quality (Dale, et al, 1999). 
Subsequently, demand for these properties will increase, causing values to rise, incentivizing 
poor property owners to sell for a profit and relocate to an area with lower prices, and potentially 
lower environmental quality (Seig, et al, 2004).  
By focusing, as I do in this study, on the period well after degradation has occurred but 
before any cleanup activities have begun, residential sorting factors are likely to be minimized. 
The environment in the community is likely not in significant flux prior to the cleanup of 
brownfields, thus even if we assume explanatory power of the residential sorting hypothesis, the 
extent to which sorting is occurring should be no more than would be normally expected. 
Viewing the relationship between people and their environment in the context of the policy 
process, we can explicitly assess the importance of timing within an analytical framework. As 
depicted in Figure 1, the policy process is viewed as a dynamic system whereby elites, political 
interests and market actors interact with and feed information back to one another during the 
lifecycle of a public policy. At any particular time, one of those forces may be stronger than 
another. Consider, for example, a point after which institutional rules have been set and policies 
have been implemented. At this point, the key activity in the policy’s lifecycle is likely the 
aggregation of individual responses and market interactions within the confines of the rules 
established by the policy. Similarly, in a period during which there are no significant 
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environmental quality changes taking place, there is little reason to suspect that economic 
incentives based on environmental quality are driving residents to sort either into or out of an 
area (although other economic incentives certainly could be). Thus, while external economic 
pressures may be a factor in determining cleanup, I expect that the decision will be more strongly 
influenced at this point by elite preferences and political action by interested stakeholders. That 
is, during this period of the lifecycle of a brownfield redevelopment, economic factors are more 
likely to have an effect as an input to the political and decision-making activities of relevant 
stakeholders and policy makers than to the behavior of individuals making residential location 
choices in proximity to the brownfield in question. 
Brownfields and Risk 
 Brownfield sites can vary considerably in the extent of pollution and the environmental 
risk posed. When a brownfield is especially contaminated and risky, it is often on the EPA’s 
National Priority List (or NPL – but more commonly referred to as Superfund). These Superfund 
sites receive considerable federal money and, while being the most hazardous, are also usually 
the most salient with the public (Messer, et al, 2006). As implied by the name of the program, 
NPL sites are the top EPA cleanup priorities and thus receive considerable attention. However, 
non-Superfund brownfield sites can still receive EPA funds through a variety of different grant 
programs. While a handful of brownfields are assessed and cleaned exclusively with private 
funds, most cleanups receive some funding benefit, either in the form of grants and direct loans 
or via indirect methods such as tax incentives from federal, as well as state and local 
governments (Meyer and VanLandingham, 2000). The prioritization of this second set of sites, 
constituting the vast majority of brownfields, is less clear; however, a key directive of the 
“Brownfields Law” requires the EPA to consider “the extent to which the [cleanup] grant would 
	   12	  
facilitate the identification and reduction of threats to the health or welfare of children, pregnant 
women, minority or low-income communities, or other sensitive populations” as well as give 
priority to grantees when “a community has an inability to draw on other sources of funding for 
environmental remediation and subsequent redevelopment of the area in which a brownfield site 
is located because of the small population or low income of the community.”1 
 Thus, the EPA is specifically directed to ensure that grants for brownfield cleanups are 
provided to low income and minority communities. However, provision of grants is not the same 
as prioritization of cleanup. The EPA has recently investigated the distribution of grants, finding 
that communities receiving brownfield grants tend to have larger minority populations and more 
poverty as compared to the national average, but this may simply be a factor of more sites being 
located in such communities, and again provides no indication about the prioritization of 
cleanups nor actual funding provided, only the distribution of grants2. In terms of prioritization, 
Hird (1990; 1993) investigated the cleanup prioritization of Superfund sites, finding that 
Superfund sites were neither more likely to be located in poor or minority counties (note: 
counties, not communities), nor did the county’s characteristics predict the prioritization of the 
cleanup effort. Several studies tangentially consider justice considerations by investigating 
changes in land values. Values decrease while brownfield sites in the Superfund subset are being 
cleaned up (McCluskey and Rausser, 2003) and increase once the cleanup has been completed 
(Dale, et al, 1999), however this increase may be limited by the visibility of the site and its 
salience with the public (Messer, et al, 2006). Some research has also considered how 
neighborhoods change after environmental conditions improve. Seig, et al (2004) noted 
increased land values in school districts after air quality improvements, while at a smaller unit of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Public	  Law	  107-­‐118	  (H.R.	  2869):	  "Small	  Business	  Liability	  Relief	  and	  Brownfields	  Revitalization	  Act"	  
2	  See:	  www.epa.gov/brownfields/policy/ej_brochure_2009.pdf	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analysis, Eckerd (2010) found that neighborhoods in which environmental risk was reduced were 
no more or less likely to gentrify than other neighborhoods.  
 However, missing in these analyses is consideration of whether the current composition 
of a neighborhood predicts whether an existing site is cleaned. Very few brownfield sites are 
actually on the NPL – in fact, most are relatively low risk with comparatively low levels of 
contamination (or suspected contamination). The prioritization of Superfund sites is relatively 
straightforward: those sites that are most risky (either in terms of contaminants or affected 
population) are prioritized. Prioritization is less clear for the substantially larger number of sites 
that are not on the NPL. Furthermore, aggregating to the county level (Hird, 1993) or zip code 
level (Arora and Cason, 1999; Seig, et al, 2004) almost certainly misses important effects at the 
neighborhood or community scale. Given the size of some counties and zip code regions, most 
residents are unlikely to be affected in any way by a brownfield site, but when the site is located 
in their neighborhood, it is more central to the neighborhood, although it should be 
acknowledged that focusing on census tracts, as I do here, may dampen effects that could be 
more pronounced by considering concentric rings surrounding a facility (Mohai and Saha, 2006). 
Nevertheless, in this analysis, I will broaden the scope and context of Hird’s (1993) analysis by 
considering a fuller range of hazardous facilities (all brownfield sites that receive any EPA 
funding, not just Superfund), and by investigating at a much more local geographic level (census 
tract).  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
	   14	  
 The data used to assess the likelihood of environmental injustice in the brownfield 
cleanup process come from several different sources. Information about brownfield sites is self-
reported from grant recipients to the EPA, which tracks detailed information about each site to 
which it provides some level of funding, including the site’s geographic location, history, and an 
inventory of known and suspected contaminants. Information about the risk characteristics of 
these contaminants was acquired from the Indiana Relative Chemical Hazard Score (IRCHS)3 
data set. In the IRCHS, chemicals have a total hazard score based upon toxicity to human health 
and persistence in air, land and water; index scores enable scaled comparison of the hazardous 
content of different types of chemicals. Demographic information for assessing socioeconomic 
status was derived from the 1990 and 2000 censuses – if a site cleaning was initiated during the 
1990s, 1990 census data was used, and if a site cleaning began during the period from 2000-
2009, 2000 census data was used. Finally, in an attempt to account for the effect of political 
activity on cleanup decisions, state level voting data was acquired for three states: California, 
North Carolina, and Minnesota. 
 Three different sets of analyses will follow a detailed description of the operationalization 
of variables. In the first model (hereafter model 1), the state of brownfield distribution is 
assessed using comparisons between characteristics of census tracts that contain brownfields 
with those that do not. These comparisons are used to understand the current layout of 
brownfield sites to determine if brownfields tend to be distributed more heavily in lower 
socioeconomic status tracts, as one would expect given direction from environmental justice 
empirical results. The second set (model 2) assesses the pace of site cleanups through survival 
analysis models predicting the likelihood of movement through phases of the cleanup process, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  IRCHS	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  Clean	  Manufacturing	  Technology	  Institute	  at	  Purdue	  University.	  For	  a	  detailed	  
description	  of	  the	  IRCHS,	  please	  see:	  engineering.purdue.edu/CMTI/IRCHS/	  
	   15	  
given the demographic characteristics of the tract in which it is located, with the expectation that 
sites in lower status tracts move through the process at a slower pace. The third set of models 
(model 3) uses logistic regression techniques to estimate the likelihood of a brownfield being 
cleaned up, holding all else constant, again, given the characteristics of the tract in which the site 
is located, with the expectation that sites in lower status communities are, overall, less likely to 
be cleaned up. 
 For model 1, I compare census tracts that contain at least one brownfield site that 
received or receives some level of EPA funding with those tracts that do not contain a site. Thus, 
the dependent variable for this set of models is the presence of a brownfield site in a census tract; 
I use this differentiation for some basic comparisons and also to estimate a logistic regression 
equation predicting the presence of an EPA funded brownfield site. The unit of analysis is the 
full set of 2000 census tracts, normalized to use either 1990 or 2000 data, depending upon 
whether the site(s) in the tract began the cleanup process before or after 20004. For the 
identification of tracts containing brownfield sites, all 6309 sites listed (as of October 2009) as 
having received EPA funding since 1990 are used in model 1, with subsets used for the estimates 
in models 2 and 3 based on data availability. It should be noted that even the full sample of 6309 
brownfield sites used here is likely not representative. There are various estimates of the total 
number of brownfield sites, ranging into the hundreds of thousands. The sample used here is 
likely not representative in that sites that receive EPA funding are likely amongst the most 
hazardous, and well-known. Further, as can be seen in Figure 2, the sites are almost certainly not 
distributed evenly geographically. As would be expected, brownfields tend to be concentrated 
near large populations in traditional industrial areas in the northeast and Midwest. It is also clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  tract	  had	  more	  than	  one	  site,	  for	  which	  cleanups	  began	  both	  before	  and	  after	  2000,	  2000	  data	  
was	  used	  for	  model	  1.	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from looking at the map that some states are clearly better at identifying brownfield sites and 
securing EPA grants for their cleanup (for example, see the border area between Oregon and 
Washington, between Maryland and Virginia, and the overall dearth EPA funded sites in Texas). 
Nevertheless, this sample is representative of the most salient sites, and those perceived to be the 
most environmentally risky. These sites also constitute the entire set of brownfields considered 
under the EPA’s environmental justice directive. 
****Figure 2 about here**** 
 Models 2 and 3 predict dependent variables based on the process through which a 
brownfield is cleaned up. For EPA purposes, during the brownfield cleanup process, a specific 
procedure is followed, with a site usually progressing through four distinct stages. In order, they 
are: 1. Phase I Environmental Assessment; 2. Phase II and in some cases Phase III 
Environmental Assessments; 3. Cleanup Activity and; 4. No Further Action Required (NFA).  
During Phase I, sites are predominantly visually assessed, relevant stakeholders are interviewed, 
and a risk assessment is carried out – generally Phase I assessment procedures are non-intrusive 
and indicate whether subsequent action is required on the site. A Phase II assessment is intrusive, 
with measurements of contaminants collected and a full site remediation is planned (Phase III is 
more intrusive, generally carried out when sites are particularly contaminated). After the 
assessment and remediation planning processes are complete, cleanup (if necessary) actually 
begins and continues until the site has been issued an NFA designation, indicating that for all 
intents and purposes, the site is safe for reuse. An NFA designation may also be issued at any 
time if the result of any of the assessment phases indicates no cause for concern if the property in 
question were reused for another purpose. That is, if a Phase I assessment shows no sign of 
visual contamination, an NFA letter will be issued and the site can be reused without 
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remediation. If a Phase I assessment shows cause for concern, a Phase II assessment is 
conducted, after which a site can a) receive an NFA designation if there is no cause for concern; 
b) enter a Phase III assessment if more specific planning and testing is required; or c) begin the 
cleanup process. Thus while a highly contaminated site could go through all stages in order, not 
all sites will. Nevertheless, the end point for any of the sites included in this study is NFA 
designation, which even if not indicative of a thorough cleanup, is indicative of a perception of 
environmental improvement, which can be as important in terms of reuse as an actual cleanup 
(McMillen and Thorsnes, 2003). The total project time is measured in months from the start of 
the Phase I Environmental Assessment through the receipt of an NFA designation, or as of 
October 1, 2009 if no NFA designation has yet been received. Phase I assessment time is 
measured via the amount of time, again in months, that a site was undergoing a Phase I 
assessment, or again until October 1, 2009 if Phase I was not yet complete. Total assessment 
time is the amount of time until either an NFA designation was received if the site did not require 
a full-scale cleanup, or the total amount of time a site required to complete all assessment and 
planning projects before cleaning could begin (or October 1, 2009 if assessment was not yet 
complete). 
For model 2, Cox regression equations (Allison, 1984) predict the odds during a specific 
period (the next month for these analyses) that sites move through a given phase. For these 
models, hazard rates predict the likelihood of a site moving through either a Phase I assessment, 
an entire assessment and planning process, or a completed project indicated by receipt of an NFA 
designation, at one month increments. The dependent variable is a time-dependent indicator of 
whether a site has completed the project or phase in question. These survival analysis methods 
are appropriate for a couple of reasons. First, sites may not have up to date information, akin to 
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the patient in a drug experiment with whom the researcher loses contact. Dropping consideration 
of these sites may bias the results. Secondly, given that not all sites go through all phases, the 
amount of time spent in any particular phase is potentially a more telling indicator of 
prioritization than other considerations. Model 3 is an assessment of the current status of 
brownfields that have received an NFA designation through a dichotomous dependent variable 
estimated through logistic regression. Sites are coded 1 if they have reached the NFA stage and 0 
otherwise.  
****Table 1 about here**** 
Independent variables generally fall into four categories: resident status characteristics, 
characteristics of the overall nature of the neighborhood, site specific characteristics, and 
political activity indicators. Neighborhood socioeconomic status is measured via a number of 
identifiers commonly included in socioeconomic status indices, from either the 1990 or 2000 
census as appropriate. These variables are included in all of the models described. Minority 
status is assessed by inclusion of the focal tract’s black and Hispanic population proportions. 
Income status is assessed via the tract median household income level (logged). Age status is 
included as the proportion of residents in the tract that are under the age of 18 and the proportion 
over the age 65. Additionally, the proportion of the tract population possessing at least a 
bachelor’s degree is included. All models also include some basic neighborhood level 
characteristics, also with data from the 1990 or 2000 census. Population density, and the percent 
of the tract that is categorized as urban are included, and the proportion of homes built prior to 
1940 is included to differentiate tracts with an older, potentially architecturally valuable housing 
stock. 
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****Table 2 about here**** 
 Model 1 predicts the presence of at least one brownfield site in a census tract, with the 
above variables as the predictors (holding state level effects constant through dichotomous 
indicators of the state in which a site is located) and census tracts as the unit of analysis. Models 
2 and 3 are assessed with brownfield sites as the unit of analysis, and in addition to the census 
tract-level variables described above, also include some site-specific characteristics. First, an 
indicator is included to identify Superfund sites, which should help differentiate between the 
most salient sites and all others (Messer, et al, 2006). Secondly, a unique proxy for risk is 
included as well based on information about the specific contaminants known or suspected to be 
present at the site. Unfortunately, the quantities (or suspected quantities) of the contaminants are 
usually unknown or unreported, so the hazardous potential for each site can only be assessed 
assuming constant contaminant quantities across sites. This is assessed using the IRCHS scores 
for the pollutants found at each site. The IRCHS score for each chemical is a standardized and 
thus comparable indicator of the level of toxicity to humans and the persistence of the chemical 
in soil, air and water. Table 3 displays some of the IRCHS scores for common brownfield 
pollutants. For each site, hazard scores of each chemical known or suspected to be present are 
summed for a total site hazard score5. Given chemicals for which information is available, the 
maximum hazard score possible is 203.7, with 0 as the minimum. As can be seen in Table 4 
(summarizing all descriptive statistics), the mean hazard score is 16.3, indicating that most sites 
are likely relatively low risk. Inclusion of a consideration for risk (albeit, an imperfect one) is 
unique in environmental justice studies, and should provide a useful contextual improvement to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  It	  may	  well	  be	  that	  the	  actual	  hazard	  is	  more	  multiplicative	  than	  additive	  when	  more	  than	  one	  pollutant	  is	  
present,	  but	  without	  knowing	  specific	  quantities	  of	  contaminants	  at	  the	  site,	  additive	  effects	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  more	  
conservative	  assumption.	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environmental justice considerations. Finally, at the site level, an indicator variable is included to 
identify sites that are located in census tracts in which at least one other site is also located. 
Hazardous sites tend to be located in proximity to other hazardous sites, and this indicator will 
identify the effect of clustering on the likelihood of site cleanup (Campbell, Peck, and Tschudi, 
2009). 
****Table 3 about here**** 
 In models 2 and 3, additional regression equations are estimated to include variables that 
relate to political activities. Secondary models are estimated only for sites located in California, 
Minnesota and North Carolina with variables included to assess the impact of political 
participation and political ideology. For sites in these three states, models include the proportion 
of registered voters who cast votes in the 2000 election, as well as the proportions of voters 
registered as Republicans and as Democrats. This measurement of the likelihood to be politically 
active is admittedly rough but substantially the same as in most previous efforts (Arora and 
Cason, 1999). Despite being one of the three key explanations of environmental injustice, it is 
rare in the literature for collective action variables to be assessed more fully than this. The case 
has been made, convincingly, that election participation is, at best, a poor proxy for collective 
political activity (Campbell, Peck, and Tschudi, 2009). Noting the data limitations, the variables 
are included here only as a rough gauge of the potential effect of broad based political activity 
and ideology in communities.  
 
RESULTS  
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 In terms of the current placement of the brownfield sites in this sample, it is clear that the 
sites are more likely to be located in lower socioeconomic status neighborhoods than in higher 
status areas. As can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 4, tracts with brownfield sites are more likely 
to have lower income levels, and larger proportion of black residents. Sites are unlikely to be 
located in areas with high levels of income and education, or those with larger proportions of 
children or elderly residents. Care must be taken, however, with regard to causality. This 
proximity result is similar to other investigations into environmental justice issues (Ringquist, 
2005), but in and of itself, provides little insight into whether issues of discrimination, residential 
sorting or political action contribute to the result. In fact, since the sites in question are those 
receiving EPA funding, this result may be indicative of the EPA following its environmental 
justice mandate to consider ways to reduce the threats to “minority or low-income communities” 
when providing brownfield grants. Or, it may also be the case that over the years, residential 
sorting occurred nearby these sites such that the current community demographics near 
brownfield sites tend to be poor with larger black populations even if that was not initially the 
case. Regardless of the specific cause, however, this result indicates that, similar to studies of 
other types of undesirable land uses, the communities in which brownfield sites are located tend 
to be poor with a larger share of minority residents. 
****Figure 3 about here**** 
****Table 4 about here**** 
 Three different dependent variables are listed in Table 5, which constitute progression 
through 1) the Phase I environmental assessment, 2) through all assessment planning phases, and 
finally 3) completion of the cleanup, indicated by achieving NFA status. Overall, the results from 
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models 2 and 3 assessing the probability of brownfield cleanup offer a complicated picture of the 
influences on environmental improvement decisions. Table 5 details survival analysis results 
using a series of Cox regressions; odds ratios report the predicted odds that given a one unit 
increase in the specific characteristic mentioned, all else equal, the site will complete the phase 
in question in the next month. For example, if the odds ratio for percent of educated residents 
was 2, this would indicate that the odds of a site completing the status in question during the 
subsequent month would double for every additional one percent increase in the proportion of 
educated residents in its neighborhood.  
****Table 5 about here**** 
Odds ratios for sites in communities with larger Hispanic populations indicate that 
assessment periods tend to take longer than for other sites, all else equal. Similarly, completion 
of the Phase I Environmental Assessment stage appears to slow down in communities with 
higher proportions of black residents. However, progression through subsequent assessment 
phases does not appear to be hampered in these communities. Interestingly, relatively wealthier 
communities (as indicated by higher levels of median household income) tend to move slowly 
through the Phase I assessments, but more rapidly through subsequent phases. Overall, the 
results indicate no other substantial trends in socioeconomic status variables, nor do the results of 
the logistic regression model estimating the probability of a site achieving NFA status, shown in 
Table 6. Sites in tracts with more highly educated residents are more likely to be cleaned up, but 
no other socioeconomic variables indicate any significant relationship with sites being cleaned 
up versus those that are not yet cleaned up. 
****Table 6 about here**** 
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 The most consistent predictors of both site cleanup and the pace of that cleanup relate to 
the characteristics of the site and its proximity to other brownfields. In a unique finding, results 
indicate that a site’s hazard score consistently increases the odds of a site progressing through 
each of the stages of cleanup. This appears to indicate a slight prioritization of more 
environmentally risky sites, as one might expect that riskier sites might otherwise take long to 
assess if prioritization were constant. Superfund sites, expected to be amongst the most 
environmentally risky, tend to progress quickly through the first phase, but then slow, most 
likely because conducting cleanup is complicated at Superfund sites. Another clear result 
through all models is that the more recently a site cleanup has begun, the more likely it is to 
progress through each of the phases more quickly; this may indicate that learning, technological 
innovation, and institutionalization of the cleaning process facilitate more efficient movement 
through the process. Another consistent result is that sites that are clustered together tend to 
make less progress through the cleaning process. When a site is located in a neighborhood with 
at least one other brownfield site, it is much less likely to be cleaned up, and is much less likely 
to move quickly through the cleanup process. 
 A final consistent result regards the general age of the housing in the tract. Brownfield 
sites are much more likely to be located in communities with larger share of older homes (those 
built prior to 1940). But in communities with the largest share of such homes, sites are 
consistently predicted to move much more quickly through all phases of cleanup (see Table 5), 
and are much more likely to reach NFA status (Table 6). Although limited to just three states, 
political and ideological characteristics of neighborhoods do not appear to indicate much of a 
relationship with site cleanup. Of course this may be due to the limitation of including these 
characteristics for so few states and sites; nevertheless, the limited sample (which does include 
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sites in California, a state commonly used a proxy for the nation) shows no indication that there 
would be a larger trend with more robust political participation data. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Three themes are discernable in the results of this study. First, site and neighborhood risk 
appear to be the most consistent predictors of the prioritization of brownfield site cleanup. Sites 
that are polluted with comparatively more dangerous toxicants tend to be cleaned up more 
quickly, although this may be tempered by a site being a particularly complicated Superfund site 
or by a site being located in the vicinity of other brownfields. So while comparatively riskier 
sites tend to be prioritized for cleanup, a higher concentration of brownfields in a neighborhood 
tends to dampen this effect. This could suggest a prioritization of cleaning sites in areas where 
redevelopment might be comparatively more economically viable. That is, when a site is risky, 
but tends to be isolated, redevelopment might be more likely than a site that, while risky, is 
surrounded by industrial sites or other contaminated land. 
 The housing stock characteristics might also indicate an economic effect. A brownfield 
site in an older neighborhood is more likely to be cleaned and to be cleaned more quickly than 
sites in other neighborhoods. An older housing stock with potentially historic architecture is 
thought to be one of the major predictors of neighborhood revitalization efforts and gentrification 
(Kolko, 2007; Eckerd, 2010). In the case of brownfields, sites located in neighborhoods with 
architecturally interesting structures may be under more pressure to be cleaned by developers or 
gentrifiers looking to increase equity in homes under renovation, or local officials may be 
pressing for cleanup in areas where they can expect the cleanup to foster redevelopment and 
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revitalization. These potential economic pressures merit future consideration; all else equal, it 
appears that the EPA may focus on cleaning up sites where it expects the cleanup to contribute to 
neighborhood redevelopment, while those sites that exist in clusters, perhaps in areas where 
revitalization is thought to be comparatively less likely move more slowly. 
 These pressures, speculatively based on risk potential and demand, appear to be more 
influential overall than any of the socioeconomic characteristics assessed, with possible 
exception of the proportion of Hispanic residents in a neighborhood. Been and Gupta (1997) 
similarly found that hazardous facilities were more likely to be sited in communities with large 
Hispanic populations; the finding here indicates that brownfield sites in communities with large 
Hispanic populations may also move through the cleaning process more slowly than sites in 
other types of neighborhoods, although they are no more or less likely to actually end up being 
cleaned. An overall finding is that sites located in predominantly minority neighborhoods 
(assessed here through the proportion of black or Hispanic residents in the community) tend to 
take longer to get through the early assessment phases, although they are no less likely to end up 
being cleaned, nor do they take appreciably longer through the entire process. This result merits 
more consideration and may indicate political considerations beyond those potentially evident in 
the models assessing voter turnout or ideological predilections. Environmental assessments and 
planning for cleanups could be relatively contentious; cleanup efforts can be complicated and 
potentially disruptive to a community (McCluskey and Rausser, 2003), but they can also provide 
short-term employment and carry the potential for economic redevelopment (McMillen and 
Thorsnes, 2003). In minority neighborhoods, this process may be more contentious owing to 
historical trends in power and mistrust of political elites (Stone, 1989) especially given that one 
of the key activities of a Phase I assessment involves talking with local stakeholders about the 
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history of the site. This result may indicate that it is more difficult for assessors to reach minority 
populations, perhaps especially those for whom English is not their primary language. This result 
can also be considered in the context of the finding that sites in wealthier communities tend to 
move more slowly through the initial assessment phase as well. Various powerful interests may 
choose intractable positions and keep a consensus cleanup plan from emerging as each side 
attempts to write their preferences into the assessment plan. Regardless, it seems clear that some 
aspect of political activity is important in the initial stages of a brownfield cleanup. As 
previously acknowledged, voter turnout in an election is, at best, a poor proxy for collective 
action, and this slowing of the initial phases of the cleanup, may be evidence of the importance 
of political activity in the process, especially in light of the fact that socioeconomic 
characteristics do not appear to be especially important predictors of the pace of the final cleanup 
of a site (the complications of the site itself appear to be the major contributors to a slowing 
down of the full cycle of the cleanup). This important process merits future consideration.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I have assessed the environmental justice implications for environmental 
improvement via a detailed view of the patterns and priories of cleaning up brownfields. 
Although sites in communities with larger proportions of minority residents move through the 
initial assessment and planning phases of the cleanup process more slowly than their 
counterparts in other neighborhoods, these sites are no less likely to ultimately be cleaned up. So 
while this research seems to indicate that cleanup and redevelopment policies, at least at the 
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federal level, are conducted with environmental justice in mind, the question of why assessing 
sites and planning cleanups in minority neighborhoods takes longer is left open. 
 Although possibly indicative of discriminatory environmental injustice, I contend that 
this result is more likely due to economic and political factors. First, economic factors appear to 
be influential in that cleanup is much more likely to happen and happen quickly when a 
brownfield is relatively isolated from other brownfield sites, all else equal. This might indicate 
an effort by policymakers to target cleanup resources on sites where they expect that 
redevelopment of the site and possible revitalization of the community are more likely than areas 
where pollution is more concentrated and intractable. Secondly, characteristics of the housing 
stock appear influential as well. Sites in communities an older housing stock are relatively more 
likely to be cleaned up and again, to move through the cleanup process more quickly. This may 
be due to economic pressures from developers and gentrification pressures from higher income 
individuals interested in reconditioning architecturally valuable land or properties (Smith, 1979).  
 These same outcomes may be affected by the political machinations occurring during the 
assessment and planning phases of the cleanup as well. In communities with relatively low levels 
of environmental risk, there may be less general political debate about the merits of one cleanup 
plan versus another. Economic interests might be aligned with those already in the community in 
wanting redevelopment to occur as quickly as possible. A lack of political disagreement may 
move sites more quickly through the initial planning phases, enabling the cleanup itself to occur 
more quickly. Conversely, in those neighborhoods where there is less consensus, the political 
debate might be carried out through the assessment and planning process. When there is 
disagreement about the plan for cleaning up a site, the realm for this debate might be the period 
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during which a brownfield site is assessed and the cleanup planned, with the expectation that the 
cleanup plan will, in part, dictate how the site is to be used in the future.  
 Nevertheless, this research ends on a generally positive note if one is concerned about 
environmental justice. Since the early 1990s, the EPA has been mandated to consider the 
environmental justice consequences of the distribution of resources used for environmental 
improvement. Although the planning process in some communities may be more complicated 
than in others, the EPA appears to have done a good job working under its mandate. For those 
sites to which the EPA contributes funds for cleanup, sites in poor or minority neighborhoods 
appear as likely to be cleaned up as their counterparts in other communities. While this result 
may or may not hold when considering the broader view of all brownfield sites, at the very least, 
the federal government has taken its environmental justice mandate seriously, while still 
maintaining a focus on cleaning up those sites that are most potentially environmentally 
hazardous to their communities. 
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Table 1: Clean Up Stage and Time Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min Max N 
For all Sites      
No Further Action (NFA) Status Achieved* 0.059 0.237 0.00 1.00 6401 
Phase I Environmental Assessment Complete* 0.985 0.121 0.00 1.00 7443 
All Environmental Assessments Complete* 0.448 0.497 0.00 1.00 7443 
Months to NFA Status** 46.910 24.540 2.00 212.00 4921 
Months to Phase I Completion** 6.156 10.511 1.00 162.00 3178 
Months to Assessment Completion** 45.530 24.702 2.00 201.00 4958 
For Sites with Political Characteristics Included     
No Further Action (NFA) Status Achieved* 0.019 0.137 0.00 1.00 1152 
Phase I Environmental Assessment Complete* 0.992 0.088 0.00 1.00 1152 
All Environmental Assessments Complete* 0.169 0.375 0.00 1.00 1152 
Months to NFA Status** 47.188 16.055 8.00 126.00 1018 
Months to Phase I Completion** 8.502 6.787 1.00 59.00 207 
Months to Assessment Completion** 47.442 15.839 9.00 126.00 1007 
Note: *Each variable is coded as a dichotomous (0/1) indicator of whether the particular clean up milestone has been 
met. **Months for sites that have not yet achieved the specified milestone are indicative of total time either in the 
stage, or for the entire process as of 10/1/2009. 
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Table 2: Other Variable Descriptive Statistics 
For Census Tract-Level Analysis (Model 1) 
  Mean SD Min Max N 
Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 0.039 0.195 0 1 64931 
Population Density (people/square mile)* 5318 12044 0.002 223600 64931 
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940* 0.172 0.189 0 1 64931 
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree* 0.232 0.169 0 1 64931 
Median Household Income (logged) 10.754 0.431 7.823 12.206 64868 
Percent of Residents Over Age 65* 0.130 0.072 0 1 64931 
Percent of Residents Under Age 18* 0.253 0.068 0 0.714 64931 
Percent of Hispanic Residents* 0.115 0.190 0 1 64931 
Percent of Black Residents* 0.140 0.238 0 1 64931 
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban* 0.775 0.375 0 1 64931 
More Than One Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 0.012 0.107 0 1 64931 
For Site-Level Analysis (Models 2 & 3) 
Population Density (people/square mile)* 3596 4296 0.002 124614 6308 
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940* 0.257 0.197 0 1 6298 
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree* 0.136 0.115 0 0.852 6302 
Median Household Income (logged) 10.387 0.450 7.823 11.802 6294 
Percent of Residents Over Age 65* 0.124 0.058 0 0.865 6308 
Percent of Residents Under Age 18* 0.271 0.077 0 0.536 6308 
Percent of Hispanic Residents* 0.129 0.187 0 1 6308 
Percent of Black Residents* 0.279 0.347 0 1 6308 
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban* 0.830 0.343 0 1 6308 
More Than One Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 0.710 0.453 0 1 6308 
Hazard Score 16.319 28.687 0 160 6308 
Superfund Site (yes=1) 0.150 0.357 0 1 6308 
Period in Which Project Began** 3.580 0.609 1 4 7443 
For Site-Level Analysis in Tracts with Political Characteristics (Models 2 & 3) 
Population Density (people/square mile)* 4157 3779 1.93 37294 1152 
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940* 0.157 0.169 0 0.7 1152 
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree* 0.124 0.107 0.001 0.709 1152 
Median Household Income (logged) 10.322 0.513 9.319 11.734 1152 
Percent of Residents Over Age 65* 0.116 0.058 0.018 0.311 1152 
Percent of Residents Under Age 18* 0.268 0.086 0.021 0.524 1152 
Percent of Hispanic Residents* 0.272 0.222 0 0.941 1152 
Percent of Black Residents* 0.207 0.273 0 0.956 1152 
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban* 0.974 0.119 0 1 1152 
More Than One Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 0.905 0.293 0 1 1152 
Hazard Score 16.233 28.857 0 140 1152 
Superfund Site (yes=1) 0.034 0.181 0 1 1152 
Period in Which Project Began** 3.501 0.517 2 4 1152 
2000 Election Turnout (percent of registered) 0.668 0.014 0.385 0.955 1152 
Percent of Voters Registered Democrat in 2000 0.549 0.157 0.242 0.914 1152 
Percent of Voters Registered Republican in 2000 0.253 0.135 0.026 0.629 1152 
Note: *Includes data from both 1990 and 2000 census where appropriate. ** Period = 1 if project began in 1990-
1995, 2 if it began from 1995-2000, 3 if 2000-2005 and 4 if 2005 - present. 
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Table 3: Hazard Scores for Some Common 
Brownfield Pollutants 
  Hazard Score 
Pollutant  
Petroleum 16.6 
Asbestos 25.6 
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) 18.0 
Lead 33.3 
Mercury 28.7 
Polyaromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH) 21.7 
PCBs 20.5 
Methane 9.6 
Propane 11.9 
Iron 7.3 
Aluminum 10.5 
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression -- Presence of a Brownfield Site in a Census Tract 
  
Odds 
Ratio    
Standard 
Error   
Population Density (people/square mile) 0.999 * 0.001  
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940 10.515 * 1.328  
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree 0.334 * 0.078  
Median Household Income (logged) 0.341 * 0.027  
Percent of Residents Over Age 65 0.292 * 0.111  
Percent of Residents Under Age 18 0.388 * 0.153  
Percent of Hispanic Residents 1.388  0.264  
Percent of Black Residents 1.744 * 0.194  
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban 1.002 * 0.001  
     
Likelihood Ratio Pseudo R2 0.168 *     
*p<.05; N=64252     
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Table 5: Cox Regression -- Likelihood of Milestone Accomplishment per Month 
Dependent Variable Phase I Complete 
Assessment 
Complete NFA Complete** 
 Odds Ratio 
  (Standard Error) 
Population Density (people/square mile) 0.999 0.999 0.999* 1.000 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940 1.335* 0.499 2.909* 0.626 6.563* 
 (0.181) (0.456) (0.602) (0.906) (3.808) 
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree 2.283* 151.174 0.948 0.738 7.705 
 (0.802) (390.346) (0.470) (1.962) (9.287) 
Median Household Income (logged) 0.701* 0.078* 1.060* 2.114 0.720 
 (0.063) (0.058) (0.156) (1.478) (0.274) 
Percent of Residents Over Age 65 1.575 0.174 2.791 0.027 15.021 
 (0.816) (0.960) (1.813) (0.136) (26.210) 
Percent of Residents Under Age 18 3.933* 0.028 0.566 0.001* 1.759 
 (1.855) (0.055) (0.375) (0.001) (3.367) 
Percent of Hispanic Residents 0.493* 2.155 0.306* 2.800 1.837 
 (0.084) (3.794) (0.107) (7.107) (1.491) 
Percent of Black Residents 0.672* 0.380 0.852 18.275 0.667 
 (0.074) (0.391) (0.161) (25.056) (0.398) 
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban 1.000* 1.045* 0.998 1.004 0.992* 
 (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.013) (0.003) 
More Than One Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 1.035 0.647 0.779* 0.178* 0.455* 
 (0.061) (0.224) (0.068) (0.076) (0.107) 
Hazard Score 1.000* 0.999 1.013* 1.001 1.017* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
Superfund Site (yes=1) 2.307* 28.146 0.174* 1.640 0.377* 
 (0.496) (64.763) (0.054) (1.583) (0.160) 
Period in Which Project Began 2.349* 4.827* 12.604* 177.71* 7.108* 
 (0.192) (2.218) (1.327) (121.73) (1.842) 
2000 Election Turnout (percent of registered) -- 3025.37* -- 0.252 -- 
  (7858.9)  (1.089)  
Percent of Voters Registered Democrat in 2000 -- 0.001* -- 272.15 -- 
  (0.001)  (1443.1)  
Percent of Voters Registered Republican in 2000 -- 0.001 -- 192.43 -- 
  (0.003)  (1089.5)  
      
Wald chi2 198.64* 93.37* 1648.2*  232.82* 
N 2273 207 4710   4909 
Note: *p<.05; ** Of 1018 sites in tracts with time to phase change and voting data, only 2 have achieved NFA status, yielding no 
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relevant conclusions. 
 
Table 6: Logistic Regression -- Likelihood of Sites Reaching NFA Status 
Dependent Variable NFA Status Achieved 
 Odds Ratio 
  (Standard Error) 
Population Density (people/square mile) 1.00 1.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent of Housing Units Built before 1940 3.452* 0.235 
 (1.146) (0.602) 
Percent of Residents with Bachelor's Degree 18.065* 3.598 
 (12.260) (17.038) 
Median Household Income (logged) 0.889 3.632 
 (0.201) (5.402) 
Percent of Residents Over Age 65 2.761 0.001 
 (3.311) (0.013) 
Percent of Residents Under Age 18 0.933 0.003 
 (1.015) (0.017) 
Percent of Hispanic Residents 1.380 0.120 
 (0.641) (0.369) 
Percent of Black Residents 0.833 0.162 
 (0.258) (0.441) 
Percent of Tract Classified as Urban 0.993* 1.010 
 (0.002) (0.023) 
More Than One Brownfield in Tract (yes=1) 0.357* 0.884 
 (0.046) (0.716) 
Hazard Score 1.022* 1.036 
 (0.002) (0.010) 
Superfund Site (yes=1) 0.774 1.954 
 (0.207) (2.331) 
Period in Which Project Began 2.206* 5.324 
 (0.308) (4.552) 
2000 Election Turnout (percent of registered) -- 0.237 
  (1.181) 
Percent of Voters Registered Democrat in 2000 -- 1749.4 
  (16182.1) 
Percent of Voters Registered Republican in 2000 -- 37.619 
  (368.525) 
   
Wald chi2 469.01* 31.93* 
N 6294 184 
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Note: *p<.05 	   	  
 
Figure 1: The Dynamic Policy Process 
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Brownfield Sites Receiving EPA Funding
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Figure 3: Comparisons of Demographic Characteristics Between Census Tracts that 
Contain Brownfield Sites and All Census Tracts
 
